Democracy by dictatorship

Democracy by dictatorship Jagdeep S Chhokar GovernanceNow | August 1-15, 2011 Democracy thrives everywhere inIndia – except in the headquarters of political parties. Here, the word of the High Command is law. Dissent is death and democracy dies every day: Fifth instalment of a six-part series on electoral reforms We, in India, often call ourselves a vibrant democracy, and with good reason. Vibrant our democracy most certainly is. But is it also real or really effective? The question may sound heretical but it is worth pondering over. What raises the question is the general belief that just because we hold periodic elections to parliament and state assemblies, and occasionally to municipalities and panchayats, it is proof enough that we have a really effective democracy. If mere holding of periodic elections was enough for a healthy democracy to exist, then what happened in Germany during the Nazi regime would not have happened since Hitler was first elected seemingly legitimately. In a somewhat similar vein, what a legitimately elected government did in India during 1975-77 also shows the fragility of a democracy that relies only on periodic elections without the underlying democratic foundations. What are these underlying democratic foundations, and why are they important? Being blinded by the hectic activity of periodic elections, we have, consistently for 60 years, overlooked the fact that no electoral system can function properly unless the underlying political system in which it operates is appropriate, just as a healthy plant cannot grow and bear good fruit unless the soil is properly prepared… the fruit in this case being governance. The point being that no electoral system can provide real and effective representation for the larger societal aspirations unless the political system underlying it is democratic in real terms. What does the “political system underlying” the electoral system consist of? The answer is provided by the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) in its 2001 report. Para 4.25 of the report says, “Political parties are an essential concomitant of elections in a representative parliamentary democracy.” However, citing the expectations of the founding fathers, the members of the Constituent Assembly,the NCRWC goes on to say that, “They (member of the Constituent Assembly) expected that an ideologically oriented healthy party system would soon evolve in independent India and that it would contribute to societal integration, nation building and strengthening the edifice of democracy. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The source of many of our troubles during the post-independence period has been our failure to evolve a healthy party system based on a just and widely acceptable political-economic national agenda.” (Emphasis added) The NCRWC then goes on to make avery incisive observation in para 4.29 of their report: “Having regard to the prevailing political scenario in the country and the hard fact that no electoral reforms can be effective without reforms in the political party system, the Commission identified the following as some of the areas of immediate concern: Institutionalisation of political parties: Need for a comprehensive legislation to regulate party activities, criteria for registration as a national or state party, de-recognition of parties. Structural and organisational reforms: Party organisations – national, state and local levels; inner party democracy– regular party elections, recruitment of party cadres, socialisation,development and training, research,thinking and policy planning activities ofthe party. Party system and governance: Mechanisms to make parties viable instruments of good governance” (Emphasis added). Deeper political reforms can be presented in three interrelated but distinct parts: registration and de-registration of political parties, internal democracy in political parties, and comprehensive legislation for the regulation and functioning of political parties. The first two are discussed in this piece, and the third, comprehensive legislation for the regulation and functioning of political parties, will be discussed in the next, and last, instalment of this series on electoral and political reforms. Internal democracy: Internal democracy in political parties is arguably the single most critical and important reform needed to make India a truly democratic society. It is absolutely beyond any doubt that political parties are sine qua non of a representative democracy that India has chosen for itself.The critical issue is how do they function or how should they function. While it would be normally expected that political parties which function in a democracy, and claim to be defenders of democracy at every opportunity, would function— in their own internal workings—in a democratic manner but that, as the NCRWC has observed, “Unfortunately,… did not happen.” This issue, internal democracy in political parties, has attracted the attention of, and drawn comments from, various commissions. Views of the NCRWC have already been mentioned. The most comprehensive study and analysis of this issue has been done by the 15th Law Commission of India, as groundwork for writing its 170th report that was titled Reform of the Electoral Laws, submitted in May of 1999.The Law Commission had prepared a working paper on the issue that was widely circulated. The Law Commission received a lot of comments, observations, and suggestions as a result of the wide circulation. The working paper was then discussed in three regional seminars (at New Delhi, Thiruvananthapuram, and Bangalore), followed by a national seminar, again at New Delhi. Taking all the responses and feedback into consideration, the Law Commission wrote a complete chapter (Chapter I of Part III) and titled it “Necessity for providing law relating to internal democracy within political parties”. This is what the Law Commission said, “On the parity of the above reasoning, it must be said that if democracy and accountability constitute the core of our constitutional system, the same concepts must also apply to and bind the political parties which are integral to parliamentary democracy. It is the political parties that form the government, man parliament and run the governance of the country. It is, therefore, necessary to introduce internal democracy, financial transparency and accountability in the working of the political parties. A political party which does not respect democratic principles in its internal working cannot be expected to respect those principles in the governance of the country. It cannot be dictatorship internally and democratic in its functioning outside” (Emphasis added) (Para 3.1.2.1). Though the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) did not comment directly on the need or otherwise of inner party democracy, it did make some very significant observations which can be interpreted or from which inferences can be drawn that have a bearing on this issue. Para 1.9 of the ARC report says, “A factor which increases corruption is over-centralisation. The more remotely power is exercised from the people, the greater is the distance between authority and accountability. The large number of functionaries between the citizen and final decision-makers makes accountability diffused and the temptation to abuse authority strong. For a large democracy, India probably has the smallest number of final decision makers.” Lack of internal democracy makes any organisation, and political parties are not an exception here, over-centralised. Also, in a party, which does not have internal democracy, power will be exercised more remotely from the people (members of the party), thereby increasing the distance between authority and accountability. And, in large political parties without internal democracy, there will be very few decision makers. As a matter of fact, it is no secret that in an overwhelming number of parties in India, there is usually only one decision-maker. In a similar vein, para 1.10 of the ARC report says, “It is well recognised that every democracy requires the empowerment of citizens in order to hold those in authority to account.” It is a moot pointas to in how many political parties in India are ordinary members (equivalent of “citizens” in a democracy) empowered to hold the party leadership to account. A very fundamental observation is made in para 1.12 of the ARC report: “Perhaps the most important determinant of integrity of a society or the prevalence of corruption is the quality of politics. If politics attracts and rewards men and women of integrity, competence and passion for public good, then the society is safe and integrity is maintained. But if honesty is incompatible with survival in politics, and if public life attracts undesirable and corrupt elements seeking private gain, then abuse of authority and corruption become the norm. In such a political culture and climate, desirable initiatives will not yield adequate dividends. Competition and decentralisation certainly reduce corruption in certain sectors. But if the demand for corruption is fuelled by inexhaustible appetite for illegitimate funds in politics, then other avenues of corruption will be forcibly opened up. As a result, even as corruption declines in certain areas, it shifts to other, sometimes more dangerous, areas in which competition cannot be introduced and the state exercises a natural monopoly. What is needed with liberalisation is corresponding political and governance reform to alter the incentives in politics and public office and to promote integrity and ethical conduct.” The ARC has done yeoman service by highlighting the importance of “the quality of politics”, the need for “political reform”, and the need “to alter the incentives in politics.” Inner party democracy is a well-known way of working towards all these three laudable objectives. It therefore stands to reason that provisions need be made to introduce inner party democracy within the political parties, by law. This should include mandatory secret ballot voting for all elections for all inner party posts and selection of candidates by the registered members, overseen by the Election Commission of India. Registration and de-registration of political parties: An anomalous situation prevails that the Election Commission has the power to register political parties but does not have the power to de-register them, in case a situation arises that warrants de-registration. This attracted the attention of the NCRWC. In its report of 2001, it explicitly said that, “The authority for registration, de-registration, recognition and derecognition of parties and for appointing the body of auditors should be the Election Commission” (Para 4.30.6). It goes on to say that the decisions of the Election Commission should be final subject to review only by the Supreme Court, and only on points of law.The proposal for giving the Election Commission powers to de-register political parties was first made by the chief election commissioner in a letter written to the law minister on July 15, 1998. The Election Commission reiterated the same in 2004, saying the following: “Political parties are registered with the Commission under the provisions of Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Section, as it stands, suffers from certain looseness by which just about any small group of persons, if they so desire, can be registered as a political party, by making a simple declaration under Section 29A(5). This has resulted in mushrooming and proliferation of a large number of non-serious parties, which causes a considerable systems load in the management of elections. By way of example, more than 650 parties are presently registered with the Election Commission, out of which only 150 or so contested in the general elections of 1998. The same trend was there in 1996 general elections as well as in 1991 general elections . Since the lay public is not aware as to how easy it is to get a political party registered with the Election Commission, probably, the motivation for the non-serious parties to get registered is to give some sort of a distorted aura of their status and standing in their localities, particularly in rural and mofussil areas. The Commission feels that election is a serious process and this tendency of small groups of individuals, who have no serious interest or desire to contest elections, should not easily be allowed to get the official stamp from the Commission as active political parties. “In addition to there not being sufficient conditions under Section 29A to deny registration to a political party, the Section also suffers from a serious infirmity that once registered, a political party would stay registered in perpetuity, even if, it does not contest any election over decades of its existence. This is because there is no specific provision to de-register a party. Similarly, certain political parties, which have served their purpose and have presently become defunct, which is normal in the functioning of a democracy, also stay on the rolls of the Commission as functioning political parties. It can readily be seen that the state of affairs is not a happy one. The Commission, therefore, suggests that under the existing Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, another clause may be introduced authorising the Election Commission to issue necessary orders regulating registration and de-registration of political parties” (Emphasis added) (Part II,Para 7). Another important electoral reform, therefore, is to give the Election Commission explicit powers to de-register political parties. Chhokar is former professor, dean, and director in-charge of Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, and a founding member of Association for Democratic Reforms (www.adrindia.org) and National Election Watch(NEW). jchhokar@gmail.com